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The Open Society Justice Initiative respectfully submits these comments 
for consideration by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (hereafter “CERD” or “the Committee”) on the occasion of its 
thematic session on non-citizens and racial discrimination on March 1-2, 2004. 
 
The Open Society Justice Initiative is an operational program of the Open 
Society Institute that promotes rights-based law reform and strengthens legal 
capacity worldwide. Justice Initiative projects shape policy and achieve concrete 
results through hands-on technical assistance, litigation and legal advice, 
advocacy, knowledge dissemination and network building. In the field of 
Equality and Citizenship, the Justice Initiative addresses the shared 
vulnerabilities of racial/ethnic minorities and non-citizens. We are currently 
working with partners to document and combat discrimination on grounds of 
citizenship and/or race/ethnicity at the global level, as well as in Mexico, Russia, 
parts of Africa, Central Asia, and central and western Europe. 
 
 We welcome the Committee’s decision to convene a thematic session on 
the rights of non-citizens at a time when those rights are under threat in many 
parts of the world. The human rights problems affecting non-citizens today are 
legion and have been addressed comprehensively in the report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens of the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. In view of this 
Committee’s mandate, the following comments are limited to those specific 
aspects of the situation of non-citizens which implicate most directly the rights 
set forth in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (hereafter “ICERD” or “the Convention”).  
    
Executive Summary 
 
The human rights of non-citizens1 are increasingly under threat. In the wake of September 
11, 2001, restrictions on the rights to asylum and the rights of migrants have accelerated in many 
countries, with countless individuals falling victim to arbitrary detention and violent acts at the 
hands of state agents. Denationalization and arbitrary or discriminatory access to citizenship are 
also growing problems, producing massive displacement and rendering stateless people who have 
never crossed an international border.   
 
Excluded from most democratic political processes, non-citizens do not have a voice in the 
making of public policy. They do not enjoy an absolute right of residency in the country in which 
they live, and often lack access to protective legal mechanisms. The legal status and treatment of 
non-citizens test traditional notions of state sovereignty at their intersection with evolving human 
rights norms.  In the words of the late Arthur Helton: 
 
Human rights law, it is often argued, touches governments at their most sensitive point: 
How they exercise power over their own citizens. While this is true, it fails to 
acknowledge the significance of international human rights law in relation to non-
citizens. The protection of non-citizens by international human rights instruments 
represents an even greater challenge to national sovereignty.2
 
The particular vulnerabilities of non-citizens are compounded by the fact that many are 
also racial or ethnic minorities.  
 
The first part of this submission underscores the close links between racial discrimination3 
and discrimination based on citizenship status in the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. 
International law prohibits racial discrimination more clearly and forcefully than citizenship-based 
distinctions. Given the frequent correlation of these phenomena, it should not be surprising that 
citizenship-based distinctions commonly serve as a pretext for racial discrimination. The 
Committee has a critical role to play in piercing the veil of impunity that frequently shields acts of 
racial discrimination against non-citizens from sanction.   
 
 The following two sections discuss manifestations of racial discrimination in the granting 
and deprivation of citizenship. In each of these areas, the coincidence of citizenship-based and 
racial discrimination serves to obscure Convention violations and frustrate the search for effective 
remedies. Section II describes instances of racial discrimination in access to citizenship, in 
violation of Article 5(d)(iii) of the Convention, through the placement of administrative obstacles 
in the path to gaining effective nationality, effectively disenfranchising entire segments of the 
population. Section III documents cases of racial discrimination in the arbitrary deprivation of 
citizenship, also in violation of Article 5(d)(iii), by amending laws or changing state practice so as 
to take away citizenship from individuals who previously enjoyed it, often rendering them 
stateless.   
 
 
 
 
 
  In view of the systematic nature of these problems, the Committee is requested to adopt a 
General Recommendation that contains the following elements: 
 
• Reaffirms that non-citizens enjoy full and equal rights under the Convention to protection 
against racial discrimination.  
 
• Expresses the Committee’s concern for the frequency with which States employ 
citizenship-based distinctions to mask racial discrimination.  
 
• Reaffirms that racial discrimination may encompass unjustified distinctions based on ethnic 
or national origin, as well as race or color. 
 
• Expresses the Committee’s concern for the increasing prevalence of violations of the rights 
of all categories of non-citizens, including through violence, mass expulsion and 
discrimination in access to rights other than citizenship, particularly insofar as they 
disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities. 
 
• Makes clear that racial discrimination in access to citizenship is a breach of States Parties’ 
obligations to secure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality (ICERD 
Article 5(d)(iii)).  
 
• Observes that States Parties to the ICERD could be in breach of Article 2(c) if their 
nationality laws have the effect of discriminating against persons of a particular national 
origin. 
 
• Notes that the denial of citizenship to large numbers of long-term residents, where it results 
in disadvantaging them in access to employment and social benefits, violates the ICERD’s 
anti-discrimination principles, including Articles 5(e)(i) and 5(e)(iv). 
 
• Clarifies that, for the purposes of this General Recommendation, the term “non-citizens” 
whose rights are at issue includes not only refugees and migrants, but all persons who are 
not nationals, or who cannot establish nationality, of the state on whose territory they live, 
including persons who have never crossed an international border. 
 
• Specifies that the racially discriminatory deprivation of nationality is a breach of States 
Parties’ obligations to secure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality 
(ICERD Article 5(d)(iii)).  
 
• Expresses the Committee’s concern for the growing phenomena of arbitrary 
denationalization and de jure and de facto statelessness, particularly insofar as they 
disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities. 
 
• Establishes and implements a specialized early warning and urgent monitoring procedure, 
extending the procedure that currently exists, to assess implementation of the Committee’s 
General Recommendation on the Rights of Non-Citizens. The Committee should also 
   
 consider designating a Special Rapporteur with principal responsibility to prepare a 
detailed report for the Committee on this subject no later than the March 2005 session. 
 
• Given the global nature of the problem, reaffirms the Committee’s request that all States 
Parties include in their regular reports information concerning the implementation of 
relevant provisions of the ICERD for non-citizens. 
 
 
 
   
  I.  Violations of the Rights of Non-Citizens:  
Citizenship-Based Distinctions as a Mask for Racial Discrimination  
 
Racial discrimination and discrimination on the grounds of citizenship often overlap such 
that distinguishing between the two can be difficult. As a result, the grounds for a particular 
discriminatory act may not always be clear. As the 2001 United Nations Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance underlined, manifestations of 
racism often involved intolerance of, and/or violence against, non-citizens.4
 
The prohibition of racial discrimination, recognized in the United Nations Charter5 and all 
major international and regional human rights instruments,6 is a jus cogens norm,7 more clearly 
developed than those protecting non-citizens and offering different, more extensive remedies. The 
ICERD specifically exempts from its application the “legal provisions of States Parties concerning 
nationality, citizenship or naturalization,”8 although it prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any 
particular nationality” among non-citizens.9  
 
Citizenship-based distinctions are nonetheless limited to an extent by international human 
rights instruments. This Committee has affirmed that the ICERD’s exemption for citizenship-
related provisions “must not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms” in 
other international instruments.10 More generally, “the architecture of international human rights 
law is built on the premise that all persons…should enjoy all human rights unless exceptional 
distinctions serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional to the achievement of that 
objective.”11 Thus, “the rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or 
statelessness…. [T]he general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.”12  
 
The principle of equality for non-citizens is subject to exceptions with respect to freedom 
of movement and rights of political participation, such as voting and holding public office.13 The 
limited attention given to the rights of non-citizens by human rights monitoring organs has meant 
that the particulars of the legal regime governing discrimination against non-citizens are not 
clear.14 The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens of the UN Sub Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has acknowledged this uncertainty in calling for 
“clear, comprehensive standards governing the rights of non-citizens, their implementation by 
States, and more effective monitoring of compliance.”15
 
Regional and national law and jurisprudence mirror the different levels of protection at the 
international level against racial and citizenship-based discrimination. For example, the European 
Union’s Race Equality Directive,16 which entered into force in 2003, is perhaps the most detailed 
regional anti-discrimination norm in the world. It sets forth strong prohibitions against both direct 
and indirect racial discrimination,17 places the burden on alleged discriminators to prove that 
“there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment” once a prima facie case of 
discrimination has been made,18 and requires that member states establish “judicial and/or 
administrative procedures” to implement its provisions19 and provide for “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive sanctions.”20 But the directive expressly exempts from its coverage “difference of 
treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions … relating to the entry into 
   
 and residence of third country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member 
States….”21  
 
The less-developed nature of the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of 
citizenship status reflects public opinion in many countries. A broad consensus disfavors 
differential treatment based on immutable characteristics such as race and ethnicity. By contrast, 
notwithstanding the reality of forced migration, refugees fleeing persecution and persons made 
stateless against their will, status as a non-citizen is considered the product of voluntary choice—
something which states may properly take into account in rationing the distribution of rights and 
benefits.  
 
The gap between law (the more settled and comprehensive protection against racial 
discrimination) and practice (the mixed nature of much discrimination against racial minority non-
citizens) creates the potential for two distinct but related problems.  
 
On the one hand, what is in fact racial discrimination is sometimes confused with, or 
characterized as, a problem of citizenship, even where the victims of discrimination are de jure 
citizens of the country at issue. In some regions, the concepts used to describe discrimination 
reflect the legacy of an anti-colonial struggle, “couched in the language of citizenship, that is, the 
right of the natives to become citizens.”22 The term “citizenship” may have particular historical or 
political resonance. In addition, it may not be widely appreciated that “racial discrimination” under 
Article 1 of the Convention encompasses different grounds, and that persons of the same skin color 
but different ethnic or national origin can be victims of racial discrimination. In such 
circumstances, a ban on ownership of land by a particular racial or ethnic group may be termed a 
denial of “citizenship” even though it is a clear case of racial discrimination.  
 
On the other hand, perpetrators of discrimination may intentionally exploit the ambiguity 
between race and nationality to shield racial discrimination from challenge where the victims 
happen to be non-citizens. The racial discrimination at issue—while clearly contrary to the law 
under the Convention—is “justified” on the grounds that non-citizens are its victims. An employer 
in the European Union who, for example, refuses to hire qualified African-born immigrants may 
succeed in defending the practice by focusing on their non-citizen status, even though this would 
appear to be a clear case of racial discrimination.  
 
The temptation to cloak racial discrimination in the language of citizenship may increase 
during times of national crisis. More than one observer has noted that the heightened scrutiny, 
surveillance and detention of certain non-citizens in the United States since September 11, 2001 
have targeted specific religious and ethnic communities.23 Racial profiling—a practice that had 
been broadly criticized in the United States and other countries—has gained renewed legitimacy in 
some quarters.  
 
 Both problems—the confusion of racial discrimination with citizenship-based distinctions, 
and the use of the language of citizenship to justify racial discrimination—are compounded by the 
fact that, since racial and ethnic categories are socially and politically defined, race and nationality 
may be different lenses for viewing the same phenomena. Since international law treats racial and 
ethnic discrimination differently from discrimination based on citizenship status, how the 
   
 violations at issue are characterized may affect public perceptions, legal remedies, and political 
solutions.  
 
 Recommendations 
 
In relation to the use of citizenship-based distinctions as a mask for racial discrimination, the 
Committee should: 
 
• Reaffirm that non-citizens enjoy full and equal rights under the Convention to protection 
against racial discrimination.  
 
• Express the Committee’s concern for the frequency with which States employ citizenship-
based distinctions to mask racial discrimination.  
 
• Reaffirm that racial discrimination may encompass unjustified distinctions based on ethnic 
or national origin, as well as race or color.  
 
• Express concern for the increasing prevalence of violations of the rights of all categories of 
non-citizens, including through violence, mass expulsion and discrimination in access to 
rights other than citizenship, particularly insofar as they disproportionately affect racial and 
ethnic minorities. 
   
 II. Racial Discrimination in Access to Citizenship 
 
International law affords states broad discretion to define the contours of, and delimit 
access to, citizenship. Determining membership in the territorially circumscribed political 
community remains one of the core attributes of state sovereignty. Article 1 of the 1930 Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws is generally 
considered to reflect customary international law in stating: “It is for each State to determine under 
its own laws who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is 
consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally 
recognized with regard to nationality.” 
 
Nevertheless, as the Convention suggests, there is an emerging international consensus that 
nationality laws and practice must be consistent with general principles of international law.  This 
view is reflected in two seminal judgments.  In 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) ruled, in the context of state allocation of nationality, that: 
 
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of 
international relations.24   
 
A 1984 Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court further held:  
 
[D]espite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and regulation of 
nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments indicate that 
international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the states 
in that area, and that the manner in which states regulate matters bearing on nationality 
cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also 
circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.25  
 
State discretion in the granting of nationality is not completely unfettered.  Article 15 (1) of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a nationality.”  
Subsequent international and regional human rights instruments have echoed this principle, 
particularly as regards to children.26  
 
The right to a nationality implies that nationality should be granted where the alternative is 
statelessness.27 Nonetheless, both the limited number of ratifications of the principal conventions 
against statelessness,28 and the widespread practice of states in creating, and refusing to protect 
against, statelessness, seem to leave open the question of whether there exists a general obligation 
under customary international law to grant nationality in case of statelessness.29  
 
Statelessness is a widespread problem that, though formally recognized by scholars and 
official bodies, has yet to generate an adequate response on the part of states. The United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees has “identified many instances throughout the world in which 
individuals may be physically present in a country, even for generations, but cannot normalize 
their stay nor establish lawful residence. This, in turn, means they can never aspire to full 
integration through naturalization.”30 One major obstacle to addressing statelessness is the 
difficulty of accurately assessing the scope of the problem: “To date, it has proven impossible to 
   
 introduce a statistical mechanism for identifying cases of statelessness globally, in part because 
very few States have a means of registering stateless persons.”31
 
International law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity in the 
granting of nationality.  As noted above, notwithstanding its general exemption clause relating to 
citizenship and nationality,32 the ICERD prohibits states from “discriminat[ing] against any 
particular nationality,”33 among other areas, in establishing criteria for citizenship. In its 
concluding observations and comments on the reports of several States Parties, the Committee has 
expressed concern about various forms of discrimination against non-citizens, including 
discriminatory requirements for entry, residence, and citizenship.34 Articles 5 (1) and (2) of the 
European Convention on Nationality (which as of January 2004 had been signed by 22 states and 
ratified by 10), prohibit discrimination in all state rules pertaining to nationality on grounds of, 
inter alia, race, color, or national or ethnic origin. 
 
In this field, as in others, the intertwining of race and nationality poses a challenge to the 
enforcement of norms prohibiting racial discrimination. Governments may, and commonly do, 
give preferential treatment to nationals of certain states in accessing citizenship, for reasons of 
common history, shared language, or other attachments. Thus, Costa Rica’s naturalization rules 
were found to be not impermissibly discriminatory, although they placed less stringent residency 
requirements on Central Americans, Ibero-Americans and Spaniards, because “[i]t would not 
appear to be inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the grant of nationality to expedite the 
naturalization procedures for those who, viewed objectively, share much closer historical, cultural 
and spiritual bonds with the people of Costa Rica. The existence of these bonds permits the 
assumption that these individuals will be more easily and more rapidly assimilated within the 
national community and identify more readily with the traditional beliefs, values and institutions of 
Costa Rica, which the state has the right and duty to preserve.”35  
 
Parties to ICERD could be in breach of Article 2(c) if their nationality laws have the effect 
of discriminating against persons of a particular national origin.36 Moreover, the denial of 
citizenship to large numbers of long-term residents could result in disadvantaging them in access 
to employment and social benefits, in violation of ICERD’s anti-discrimination principles.37   
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing norms, governments not uncommonly discriminate on the 
grounds of race and ethnicity in allocating rights of entry and access to citizenship.38 A leading 
authority has suggested that in practice, the non-discrimination norm “has not been applied to 
impose close scrutiny in evaluating the widely varied distinctions that states use for admission and 
expulsion grounds.  In this field, the norm serves primarily to place a modest burden on the state to 
come forward with a plausible justification for any distinctions drawn in law or practice.”39  
 
In recent decades, governments have been more careful to couch their preferences in the 
internationally accepted language of nationality and citizenship. Many governments continue 
effectively to discriminate in entry on grounds of race, however, even though they do not officially 
recognize it as such. In some countries, such as Japan, it is still quite difficult to become a 
naturalized citizen. In other countries, states determinedly deny citizenship to members of certain 
ethnic groups. An authority on citizenship in Africa has written, “The permanent alienation of 
   
 whole [ethnic] communities due to relatively strict citizenship laws is an especially important 
problem in Africa.”40   
 
As the following case studies show, the practice of racial and ethnic discrimination in 
access to citizenship is still prevalent throughout the world:  
 
Rohingya in Burma41
  
The Rohingya Muslim minority has been living in the northern state of Ankara in Burma since 
the 12th century. Although nearly all Rohingya or their parents were born in Burma, have resided 
there, and have family there, the Burmese government refuses to recognize them as citizens, 
terming them “illegal immigrants.” The Burmese citizenship law of 1982 provides for several 
categories of citizenship. The Rohingya are deemed to satisfy none, rendering them potentially 
stateless, as no other state recognizes them as nationals. The Burmese government has restricted 
Rohingya freedom of movement, limited their access to secondary education and employment, 
subjected them to forced labor, arbitrarily confiscated their property, and forced Rohingya couples 
to request permission at many different levels of government in order to marry.    
 
Dominicans of Haitian Descent42
 
Haitians have migrated and settled in the Dominican Republic throughout the course of the 
past century, entering the country primarily as workers in the sugar plantations (“bateys”) or other 
low-income occupations. Today, a sizeable population of Dominicans are of Haitian descent, 
including individuals and families who have resided in the country for decades. Due to the 
pervasiveness of anti-Haitian animus at many levels of government and society, Haitians born in 
the Dominican Republic are denied the possibility to establish nationality. They continue to be 
treated as “foreigners” or “black invaders” conspiring to take over the country and leave no jobs 
for “true” Dominicans.  
 
Under the Dominican Constitution, all persons born within the country’s territory are 
Dominican citizens. The only exception, under Article 11, is for children of foreigners “in transit” 
through the Dominican Republic. In an effort to bar Dominicans of Haitian descent from claiming 
lawful citizenship, Dominican authorities routinely claim that Dominicans of Haitian descent are, 
in fact, “in transit”—even those who have lived in the country for decades. Some medical 
personnel have refused to provide undocumented parents of newborns with birth certificates—a 
prerequisite for obtaining a cedúla, proof of Dominican citizenship. The inability to secure proof 
of citizenship has generated a cycle of discrimination and mistreatment in many spheres of public 
life. Fear of deportation has led many ethnic Haitians to avoid hospitals, local electoral boards or 
other organs of state authority.  
 
The Bidun of Kuwait43
 
The Kuwaiti government applies the classification Bidun to several groups of individuals, 
including descendants from nomadic groups and migrants who have lived in Kuwait for decades 
and have therefore lost all effective links with their ancestral homes.  Kuwait’s Nationality Law 
creates a category of “original Kuwaiti nationals” who are, by virtue of that status, eligible for 
   
 automatic nationality, resulting in a higher level of rights and protections in Kuwaiti law. “Original 
Kuwaiti nationals” are “persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who maintained 
their normal residence there until the date of the publication of the law [May 21, 1959].” The 
Bidun are among those unable to meet these requirements and have thus been denied automatic 
nationality.  All children of Bidun parents are also considered Bidun, including the children of 
Kuwaiti mothers and Bidun fathers.   
 
Until the mid-1980s, even though they were denied automatic nationality, the Bidun were 
treated as lawful residents of Kuwait whose claims for citizenship were under consideration.  In 
1985, the government began applying provisions of Alien Residence Law 7/1959 to the Bidun and 
subsequently issued a series of regulations stripping them of almost all their previous rights and 
benefits.  Commencing in 1986, the government restricted Biduns’ eligibility for travel documents 
and fired all Bidun government employees (except for those employed by the police or the 
military) who could not provide valid passports; private employers were required to pursue the 
same policy. In 1987, the government began to refuse Bidun registration for automobiles and 
applications for driving licenses, severely restricting their freedom of movement. That same year, 
Bidun children were barred from attending public schools. In 1998, this ban was extended to the 
university level. The government has also instructed all private clubs and associations to dismiss 
any Bidun members.  
 
In May of 2000, the Ministry of the Interior ended a nine-month program during which 
Bidun who signed affidavits admitting to a foreign nationality and renouncing claims to Kuwaiti 
nationality could apply for a five-year residency permit. Despite the fact that many Biduns have 
lived in Kuwait for generations, have effective links to the national society, and reasonably 
consider Kuwait as their home country, their access to Kuwaiti citizenship is increasingly blocked. 
 
The Hill Tribes in Thailand44
 
 Thailand’s Hill Tribe people, who include members of the Akna, Lanu, Lisu, Yao, Hmong, 
and Karen ethnic communities, number over one million. Despite being born in Thailand, almost 
half of the Hill Tribe people lack Thai citizenship, and are thus unable to vote, buy land, seek legal 
employment, or travel freely. Since an influx of refugees and migrants into Thailand in the 1980s, 
the Thai government has effectively denied Hill Tribe people citizenship, with some officials 
maligning them as drug dealers, environmental criminals, national security threats, and illiterate 
and uncivilized “foreigners.”  
  
 On August 28, 2001, the Thai Cabinet granted temporary residency rights for one year to 
those “tribal and indigenous” peoples who had previously taken part in government surveys and to 
others lacking identification. A deadline of August 28, 2002, was set for these groups to regularize 
their status. To secure citizenship, Hill Tribe members had to show that they, and at least one of 
their parents, had been born in Thailand. This has been difficult for those born in remote 
mountainous communities where birth registration is rare. The process of verification of status 
itself has been fraught with bureaucratic delay and allegations of corruption. The government 
extended the deadline to August 28, 2003, but by July 2003 more than 200,000 applications for 
citizenship had not been reviewed. An additional 200,000 people had no supporting evidence to 
document their birth and continuous residence in Thailand.  
   
  
 Following expiry of the most recent filing deadline, many Hill Tribe people, considered 
illegal migrants and/or stateless, have lived under threat of expulsion, and been denied access to 
many economic and social benefits.  
 
Meskhetians in Russia45
 
In the Russian Federation, the regional authorities in Krasnodar Krai have arbitrarily 
denied approximately 13-16,000 Meskhetians, a Turkish-speaking Muslim ethnic minority, all 
rights of Russian citizenship to which they are entitled as former Soviet citizens. As a 
consequence, the Meskhetians cannot secure permanent employment, officially register their 
marriages, or access social security, health care, and post-secondary education. Furthermore, many 
are subject to arbitrary checks of their registration documents, and are prevented from officially 
registering their home or vehicle purchases.  
 
The local Krasnodar authorities have repeatedly singled out the Meskhetians through 
special residency regulations citing their ethnicity as the basis for their disparate treatment. These 
authorities openly admit that their goal is to coerce the Meskhetians to leave the region—to 
“squeeze” them out. These racist policies are unabashedly supported by high-level regional 
officials. In 2001, the governor of Krasnodar was quoted as saying, “I say to them [Meskhetians], 
do not forget that you are guests in our land... [All] available mechanisms of pressure and 
persuasion will be employed to increase the number of ‘guests’ leaving.”  
 
UNHCR has described Meskhetians de jure citizens, de facto stateless: under federal 
Russian law, they are entitled to Russian citizenship because they were “permanently residing” in 
the Russian Federation at the time the 1992 Citizenship Law came into effect and did not decline 
Russian citizenship. In direct violation of federal regulations, local authorities have subjected the 
Meskhetians to constraints on their freedom of movement, arbitrary determination of their right to 
reside in the Krasnodar territory by local “Commissions of Migration Control,” onerous taxation 
policies targeted specifically at their ethnic group, and unofficial sanctioning of violence 
perpetrated by self-styled “Cossack” groups.  
 
Kenyan Nubians 
 
 The Nubian community of Kenya is composed of more than 100,000 descendants of 
persons originally from the territory of  Sudan, who were brought to East Africa by the British 
colonial government and resettled in various regions of modern-day Kenya over 100 years ago. 
“Although the Nubians should be considered as Kenyan citizens under the prevailing laws, the 
overwhelming majority of them live as de facto stateless persons without adequate legal 
protection. They are systematically denied their right to Kenyan citizenship and to own land….”46 
When pursuing citizenship documentation, Nubians have been requested to produce grandparents' 
identification cards, which are almost impossible to obtain. Unlike other ethnic groups in Kenya, 
the Nubians have not received official recognition as a distinct Kenyan community with a unique 
culture, language, history and religion.47   
 
 
   
 Recommendations 
 
In relation to access to citizenship, the Committee should: 
 
• Make clear that racial discrimination in access to citizenship is a breach of States Parties’ 
obligations to secure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality (Article 
5(d)(iii)).  
 
• Observe that States Parties to the Convention could be in breach of Article 2(c) if their 
nationality laws have the effect of discriminating against persons of a particular national 
origin. 
 
• Note that the denial of citizenship to large numbers of long-term residents, where it results 
in disadvantaging them in access to employment and social benefits, violates the 
Convention’s anti-discrimination principles, including Articles 5(e)(i) and 5(e)(iv). 
   
 III.  Racial Discrimination in Deprivation of Citizenship 
 
In countries across the world, racial and ethnic minorities have been arbitrarily stripped of 
their nationality and rendered stateless. Arbitrary deprivation of nationality leaves minority groups 
vulnerable to expulsion, imprisonment and arbitrary detention, and frequently results in the denial 
of social services, education, and employment opportunities. Victims who flee abusive conditions, 
as well as those forcibly expelled, often are unable to re-enter their own country and are not 
recognized as former residents. 
 
Deprivation of nationality is a phenomenon of concern well beyond the circle of direct 
victims. During the 1930s and 1940s, the failure of European governments to provide protection to 
Jews and others rendered stateless by Nazi-inspired Nuremberg nationality laws degraded the very 
concept of human rights in the eyes of the world.48   
 
While states retain broad control over access to citizenship, the power to withdraw 
citizenship once granted is more limited. In particular, states may not deprive persons of 
citizenship arbitrarily or in such a way as to engender statelessness.49 In order not to be arbitrary, 
deprivation of citizenship must be prescribed by law, non-discriminatory, and accompanied by 
procedural due process, including review or appeal.50 In addition, while permissible in some 
instances (for example, to avoid dual nationality), any deprivation of nationality that resulted in 
statelessness would be considered arbitrary. 
 
The prohibition of statelessness and arbitrary deprivation of nationality has been strongly 
reinforced by various United Nations bodies.  In 1988, the UN Sub-Commission’s Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to 
His Country, stated: 
 
In view of human rights law, denationalization should be abolished. It constitutes a 
breach of international obligations ... The recognition of the right to nationality as a 
basic human right, in effect, limits the power and freedom of a State arbitrarily to 
deprive its citizens of nationality.51
 
The UN General Assembly also reiterated the principle of the avoidance of statelessness at 
its 50th session (1995) when it called on states: 
 
[T]o adopt nationality legislation with a view to reducing statelessness, consistent with 
the fundamental principles of international law, in particular by preventing arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality and by eliminating the provisions that permit the renunciation 
of a nationality without the prior possession or acquisition of another nationality .…52
 
States may not discriminate against particular ethnic or racial minorities in the withdrawal 
of nationality.  The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness stipulates that states “may 
not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or 
political grounds.”53  Other regional and international instruments pertaining to nationality also 
reflect this principle of non-discrimination.54  
 
   
 While statelessness was first recognized as a global problem during the First and Second 
World Wars, in the past decade and a half growing numbers of persons have again lost their 
nationality. The manifestations of this most recent wave of denationalization have varied from 
place to place. However, one common denominator has been that ethnic and racial minorities have 
been the principal victims. 
 
In Europe, the primary cause has been the changes in post-1989 borders that followed the 
collapse of Communism. As multi-ethnic states such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia disintegrated, ethnic minority groups—ethnic Russians, Croats, Bosnians and 
Roma, among others—left on the wrong side of a new border commonly encountered difficulties 
in effectively acquiring or establishing citizenship in the newly emergent states.  
 
In Africa during the same period, citizenship became more important and controversial, 
precisely as democratization in much of the continent gave added significance to membership in 
the political community and the concomitant questions of who can and cannot vote or hold public 
office. Increasingly restrictive citizenship laws in some countries, such as the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zambia, served as effective tools for political manipulation by public 
officials who sought to expel and/or delegitimize particular ethnic groups.  
 
In Asia and the Middle East where nationality is primarily conferred on a jus sanguinis 
rather than a jus solis basis (by descent rather than by birth), there has been a growing trend for 
repressive governments to use the denial or deprivation of nationality as a tool to exclude and 
marginalize unpopular racial and ethnic minority groups.  In many instances this has led to the 
mass expulsion of particular ethnic groups whose citizenship is not recognized and who cannot 
exercise their right to return to their own country. Women face particular difficulties in regards to 
citizenship in many Asian and Middle Eastern states due to discriminatory marriage and 
nationality laws. 
 
The following are examples: 
 
Bhutanese Refugees55
  
Over 100,000 Bhutanese refugees of ethnic Nepali origin were arbitrarily deprived of their 
nationality and forcibly expelled from Bhutan in the early 1990s, in clear violation of international 
law. The refugees’ right to return to Bhutan has been systematically obstructed by the Bhutanese 
government. They are also refused citizenship in Nepal, and are stranded in a legal limbo.   
 
 The Bhutanese government stripped the southern Bhutanese of their citizenship in order to 
expel and exclude an unpopular ethnic and religious minority. The Bhutanese refugees in Nepal 
are predominantly Hindus from southern Bhutan, ethnically and culturally distinct from the 
majority ethnic group and ruling elite in Bhutan—the Buddhist Ngalongs from northern Bhutan, 
who are of Tibetan origin and speak the national language, Dzonkha. 
 
Many southern Bhutanese had been granted citizenship under Bhutan’s 1958 Nationality 
Law. However, in 1977 and 1985, Bhutan introduced two new Citizenship Acts, the second of 
which narrowed the requirements for naturalization to include: twenty years of residency in 
   
 Bhutan; the ability to speak, read and write Dzonkha proficiently; good knowledge of the history 
and culture of Bhutan; a good moral character; no “record of imprisonment for criminal offenses in 
Bhutan or elsewhere”; and “no record of having spoken or acted against the King, country and 
people of Bhutan in any manner whatsoever.” Most controversially, the Act retroactively made 
1958 the cut-off date for determining citizenship. In order to be granted citizenship, it was 
necessary to produce land tax receipts or other proof of residency in Bhutan dating from on or 
before December 31, 1958.   
 
The racist roots of the citizenship laws were evident in the draconian “Bhutanization” 
policies that accompanied them. In the late 1980s, the government forced the language, dress and 
cultural etiquette of northern Bhutan on the southern Bhutanese. The Nepali language was banned 
in public places and removed from the school curriculum. Southern Bhutanese were fined and 
punished if they did not wear northern Bhutanese dress in public. Schools and health services were 
closed and southern Bhutanese were expelled from the public services. Government forces 
destroyed houses, confiscated crops, and forced southern Bhutanese off their lands.  
 
By 1992, tens of thousands of southern Bhutanese had fled these abuses or were forcibly 
deported. Many were forced to sign so-called “voluntary migration” certificates by local officials 
when they left the country—surrendering their rights to Bhutanese citizenship. Most sought refuge 
in Nepal where they now live in camps administered by UNHCR. After fifteen rounds of joint 
ministerial talks between Nepal and Bhutan, the refugees are no closer to returning to their homes 
in Bhutan.   
 
Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
 The Banyamulenge are a Kinyarwanda-speaking ethnic group many of whose members 
have resided in the northeastern corner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly 
Zaire) since before the creation of colonial boundaries. Other Banyamulenge immigrated to the 
DRC from Rwanda and Burundi, with the approval of the Belgian colonial authorities.56  
 
 Although the Banyamulenge were considered citizens in previous constitutions and laws, in 
1981 the Zairian government limited citizenship to those individuals who could prove that their 
ancestors belonged to an ethnic group “known to exist” within the borders of the territory later 
known as Zaire “as defined in August 1885.”57 This change in the citizenship laws affected more 
than 1.5 million Banyamulenge, who were no longer automatically Zairian; in principle, they had 
to formally apply and be granted citizenship.58 Although the law was not actively enforced during 
the 1980s, it represented an official discriminatory stance toward Banyamulenge, which was 
aggravated by the crisis in the Great Lakes Region in the 1990s.  
  
 Politicians used the citizenship law and growing unrest to stir up feelings against the 
Banyamulenge among neighboring ethnic groups. In 1991, a politician from the Bembe ethnic 
group in the South-Kivu region of DRC led a move to exclude the Banyamulenge, claiming they 
were not Zairians but Rwandan (also Kinyarwanda-speaking) immigrants. Following the sharp 
influx after 1994 of Rwandan refugees fleeing genocide in their home country, leaders of other 
ethnic groups increasingly challenged the rights of Banyamulenge to Zairian citizenship. On April 
28, 1995, the parliament passed a law preventing recent Rwandan and Burundian refugees from 
   
 claiming citizenship, and defined the Banyamulenge as “immigrants who have acquired Zairian 
nationality fraudulently.”59 This law forbade “foreigners” to sell or trade any assets (including land 
and houses), authorized the cancellation of any transactions underway, and barred them from 
political and military office. Banyamulenge were banned from administrative posts.60 The 
government also began to interfere in Banyamulenge-initiated civil society activities. In October 
1996, the DRC authorities ordered that all Banyamulenge leave the country.61  
 
The increasing violence and discrimination faced by Banyamulenge played a role in the 
deepening crisis in Zaire. In September 1996, militia supported by the Zairian Armed Forces 
attacked Banyamulenge villages, killing, raping, and forcing survivors to flee.62 Although many 
Banyamulenge joined Laurent-Desiré Kabila, little changed on his accession to power in 1997.63 In 
1998, a draft constitution again stripped most Banyamulenge of citizenship.64 Violations of the 
rights of Banyamulenge are seen as a pivotal factor in sparking the civil war that embroiled the 
country and region.  
 
According to the Congolese ambassador to South Africa, citizenship has been restored to 
Banyamulenge since Joseph Kabila became president in 2001.65 However, a new DRC constitution 
has yet to be adopted by the new power-sharing government, and inter-ethnic tension remains 
high.   
 
Ethnic Serbs from Croatia66
 
Citizens of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) possessed both federal 
citizenship and citizenship of one of the six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. However, the latter was of little practical use, and 
many failed to claim it.   
 
Following the SFRY’s dissolution, the emerging states re-drafted their own citizenship laws, 
and republican citizenship—once an afterthought—became a central point of contention. As all the 
successor states recognized the principle of legal continuity in their new citizenship laws, no 
citizen of the SFRY was rendered de jure stateless at the time of dissolution. In practice, however, 
in those states overrun by armed conflict, hundreds of thousands were unable to obtain citizenship 
of the state in which they were habitually resident, where this differed from their state of original 
citizenship. Ethnic minorities were worst affected. Through a variety of legal devices, some states 
attempted to bar long-term minority residents from citizenship. As a result many were effectively 
denationalized.  
 
In Croatia, for example, residents who had not previously held Croatian republican citizenship 
were required to apply for naturalization, unless they were ethnic Croatians, or were born in 
Croatia to at least one Croatian parent. Croatian Serbs often found themselves foreigners in their 
own country. Large numbers who had fled to Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were 
unable either to obtain citizenship or to return to their homes in Croatia. Lack of citizenship 
affected Croatian Serbs in myriad other ways, restricting their freedom to leave and re-enter 
Croatia; their ability to access reconstruction assistance; their right to work, and their ability to 
obtain official returnee status.67
 
   
  
 Recommendations 
 
 In relation to the arbitrary deprivation of nationality and statelessness, the Committee 
should: 
 
• Make clear that, for the purposes of this General Recommendation, the term “non-citizens” 
whose rights are at issue includes, not only refugees and migrants, but all persons who are 
not nationals, or who cannot establish nationality, of the state on whose territory they are 
present, including persons who have never crossed an international border. 
 
• Specify that the racially discriminatory deprivation of nationality is a breach of States 
parties’ obligations to secure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality 
(Article 5(d)(iii)).  
 
• Express concern for the growing phenomena of arbitrary denationalization and de jure and 
de facto statelessness, particularly insofar as they disproportionately affect racial and ethnic 
minorities.  
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